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to alter the established
doctrine. 3' Writers in legal periodicals have
82
view.
this
shared
The decision in the instant case squarely aligns New York
courts with this latter view; and although it cannot be said that New
York precedent clearly supports the ruling,3 3 Justice Callahan has
found ample justification for his expressed conclusion. It is his contention, adopted from the case of Hart v. Mealy,"3 4 that in its enactment of Section 355 of the New York Civil Practice Act 35 the state
legislature ".

.

. recognized the weakness of evidence of a traffic in-

fraction as proof of the facts which may have been involved." 36
Further, he asserts that ".

.

. the rule of public policy thus declared

seems to go beyond the mere question of privilege or credibility of a
witness." 7 Inasmuch as receipt of the certificate of conviction is
tantamount to obliging a witness to testify to the prior verdict against
him, the logic and force of the conclusion reached in the instant case
is compelling.3 8

EVIDENCE-WHEN NEGATIVE TESTIMONY RAISES AN ISSUE FOR
THE JuRY.-Plaintiff's intestate was killed in a collision with a train
owned and operated by defendant. Decedent stopped her car at a
crossing, allowed an eastbound train to pass, and then proceeded.
The car was struck by a westbound train. The crew on the west31

32

General Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Sherby, 165 Md. 1, 165 At. 809 (1933).
Note, 50 YALE L. J. 499.

33 In an action arising out of an intersection collision, judgment of conviction of the defendant for violation of an ordinance in exceeding speed limit

at the time of the accident was held admissible as prima facie evidence of the
facts involved. Same v. Davison, 253 App. Div. 123, 1 N. Y. S. 2d 374 (4th
Dep't 1937). But see Merkling v. Ford Auto, 251 App. Div. 89, 96, 296 N. Y.
Supp. 393, 401 (4th Dep't 1937).
34287 N. Y. 39, 38 N. E. 2d 123 (1941).
35 See note 2 supra.
36 Walther v. News Syndicate Co., 276 App. Div. 169, 174, 93 N. Y. S. 2d

537, 543.

37 Ibid.

38 N. Y. VanicLE & TRAFFIc LAW § 70, subd. 11, provides: "Upon the
conviction of any person . . . of a violation of any of the provisions of this
chapter or of any lawful ordinance, except a parking ordinance, made by local
authorities in relation to traffic . . . the trial court or the clerk thereof shall
within forty-eight hours certify the facts of the case to the commissioner,
who shall record the same in his office. Such certificate shall be presumptive
evidence of the facts therein."
(Italics supplied.)
It has been urged
(14 BROOKLYN L. Rxv. 246) that this provision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law
precludes the court from ruling as it has in the instant case. However, the
single provisions of a given statute must be read in their relation to the whole
of the statute. [Merkling v. Ford Auto, 251 App. Div. 89, 94, 296 N. Y. Supp.
393, 399 (4th Dep't 1937).] So read, the above provision of Section 70 would
seem to be applicable only in those cases where the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles is proceeding to revoke the operating license of an offending driver.
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RECENT DECISIONS

bound train testified that the warning whistle was sounded, but the
crew on the eastbound testified that they heard no whistle. The trial
judge dismissed the complaint on the ground that no issue of fact
on the question of negligence was raised by the negative testimony,
it being of doubtful sufficiency as against the direct and positive
affirmative testimony. The Court of Appeals held that the issue of
defendant's negligence was a jury question. Latourelle v.New York
Cent. R.R., 301 N. Y. 103, 92 N. E. 2d 911 (1950).1
Testimony to the effect that a fact would have been seen or
heard had it occurred is treated by most courts as having no inherent
weakness. 2 A problem of relative probative value arises, when, in
the face of affirmative testimony that a fact occurred, there is testimony by others that they did not hear or see the fact.
Many factors are considered by the courts in such testimony.
Some attribute little weight to a "not seen" or "not heard" as distinguished from a positive "not given," especially when it appears
that the witness' attention was not directed toward the fact at the
time. 3 When, however, the attention of the witness was centered
upon the fact in issue, testimony that it was "not seen" or "not
heard" was taken as a positive assertion that the fact had not
occurred.4 Little or no force is attached to testimony by a witness
that he does not remember hearing or seeing a fact.5 Notice is also
taken of the interest of the parties in the suit,6 their powers of
observation and their attentivenessY The physical position of the
witness is the most important single factor to be considered in determining the weight to be accorded negative testimony. Negative
testimony offered by a witness in a favorable position is often held
of sufficient weight to create a jury question.8
I The court also ruled that testimony based solely on estimates did not
support the railroad's contention that decedent was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law.
2
WIGO o., EviDExcE § 664 n. 1 (3d ed. 1940).
3 Culhane v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. R., 60 N. Y. 133 (1875).
For example: (a) The signal was not given. (b) I did not see the signal given.
(c) I did not hear the whistle.
4Fish v. Southern P. R. R., 173 Ore. 294, 143 P. 2d 917 (1944) (little
significance given to choice of words).

' Pere Marquette Ry. v. Anderson, 29 F. 2d 479 (7th Cir. 1928)

(physical

position of much significance) ; cf. Wellbreck v. Long Island R. R., 31 Misc.
424, 665 N. Y. Supp. 592 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
Pettit v. Pennsylvania R. R., 3 N. J. Misc. 90, 127 AUt. 173 (1925)

(probative value of testimony lessened by lack of disinterest); Hartwell v.
Navin, 268 App. Div. 939, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 193 (3d Dep't 1944) (probative
value of testimony augmented by disinterest of witness).
7Henavie v. New York C. & H. R.R., 166 N. Y. 280, 59 N. E. 901 (1901).
8 Greany v. Long Island R. R., 101 N. Y. 419, 5 N. E. 425 (1886). In
Northern Pacific R. R. v. Freeman, 174 U. S. 379 (1889), an accident
occurred at a highway crossing at a point where the highway crossed the railway track at nearly right angles. The Supreme Court of the United States
stated:

"There was testimony from several witnesses in the neighborhood

tending to show that no whistle was blown by the engineer as the train ap-
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In the principal case the Appellate Division, in holding that the
testimony of the crew on the eastbound train failed to raise an issue
of fact on the question of defendant's negligence, relied chiefly on
two cases, Foley v. N. Y. Central & H. R. R. R.9 and Culhane v.
N. Y. Central & H. R. R. R.,10 which stand for the proposition that
testimony negative in character does not raise an issue, as against
affirmative testimony, when it appears that the attention of the witness so testifying was not directed to the fact at the time. In the
Foley case it appeared that the position of the witnesses was unfavorable, while in the Culhane case the witnesses were the parties struck
by the train.
It is to be observed that the instant case is distinguishable from
both the Culhane and Foley decisions. In the Culhane case the plaintiff's agent was the witness, while here the witnesses were disinterested parties. In the Foley case the witnesses were not in a
favorable position, while in the principal case it appears from the
evidence that the eastbound train was abreast of the westbound at the
time the warning is alleged to have been sounded. The trainmen
aboard the eastbound were thus in such proximity to the whistle
that, in the nature of things, they probably would have heard it had
it been sounded, or so a jury might have found.
It is submitted that the court, recognizing from the nature of
the affirmative and negative testimony offered that reasonable minds
could differ on the presence or absence of a warning signal, was
correct in referring the question of defendant's negligence to a jury.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT-

RESTRAINT OF MENTALLY ILL PER-

SONS.-At the instance of the husband, defendant psychiatrist visited
the plaintiff wife. After the husband told of alleged violent threats
made by the wife, which she denied, the defendant called the police.
The plaintiff refused to go with the police because they bad no warrant. They nevertheless overpowered her and took her to a hospital
from which she was later released as sane. The police had acted
upon the defendant's representation of her insanity and under his
direction. Plaintiff brought suit for false imprisonment. The District of Columbia Code permits the arrest of an alleged mentally ill
person without a warrant, if found in a public place; I or if the person
proached the crossing. There was also testimony of the conductor, engineer
and fireman that the whistle was blown. As the majority of plaintiff's witnesses were so located that they would probably have heard the whistle if it
had been blown, there was a conflict of testimony with respect to defendant's
negligence which was properly left to a jury." Id. at 381.
. 197 N. Y. 430, 90 N. E. 1116 (1910).
1060 N. Y. 133 (1875).
1 D. C. CoDE § 21-326 (1940).

